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IN THE DEFENSE OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY:
THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE*
Nadine Strossen**
The American Civil Liberties Union is accustomed to being the subject of debate and controversy. Usually, the position we have taken in a
particular legal case is at issue. Lately, however, disagreements about the
fundamental nature of the ACLU's mandate and its proper role have
occupied the media spotlight.' The criticism essentially charges that the
ACLU is abandoning its traditional commitment to free speech and other
classic civil liberties and is becoming a "trendy"
liberal organization
2
primarily concerned with equality and civil rights.
In addressing what I call this "civil-rights-versus-civil-liberties" critique 3 I do not want to overstate its importance in the overall scheme of
the ACLU's work. Of all the criticism we receive, both in the media and
in correspondence, the "rights-versus-liberties" line clearly constitutes a
small minority position. The vast majority of the press and other critics
continue to complain that the ACLU too zealously defends free speech
* Adapted from a speech delivered at the opening plenary session of the 1993 ACLU
Biennial Conference, Atlanta, Georgia (June 17, 1993).
** Nadine Strossen is President of the American Civil Liberties Union and Professor
of Law at New York Law School. The author thanks Thomas Hilbink, William Mills, and
Tony Ross for their valuable research assistance; the editors of the Harvard Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance; and the New
York Law School Administration for its generous support of her research and writing.
I See, e.g., Dennis Cauchon, Civil Dispute Within the ACLU: Debate Over Competing
Principles,USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 1993, at IA; Richard Ostling, ACLU-Not All That Civil,
TIME, Apr. 26, 1993; Neil A. Lewis, At A.C.L. U., Free-Speech Balancing Act, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 1993, at 16.
2The charge of being "trendy" has been leveled, for example, by Nat Hentoff in
Punish the Act-Not the Idea-of Bigotry, LEG. TiMEs, Apr. 5, 1993, at 25.
3Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz and writer Nat Hentoff have been two of
the most outspoken proponents of this critique. For examples from Professor Dershowitz,
see Alan Dershowitz, The True Test for True Free-Speech Believers, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, July 23, 1990, at 42 ("One group that is in danger of being drummed out of the
First Amendment Hall of Fame is the American Civil Liberties Union. Until recently, it
was a charter member. But over the past few years, it has gotten soft on the First
Amendment when it comes to racist, sexist, and homophobic speech on college campuses."); Alan Dershowitz, Censors Huntfor New Target, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Apr. 21,
1990, at 20A.
For examples from Hentoff, see NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR

THEE 164-66 (1992); Nat Hentoff, ACLU's Civil War on Hate Speech, SACRAMENTO BEE,

Feb. 12, 1993, at B12; Nat Hentoff, Broadcastsby Big Brother; FairnessIs Not Achieved
by Government Regulation of Speech, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1993, at A25; Nat Hentoff,
Scalia Outdoes the ACLU, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, at A19; Nat Hentoff, Susceptible
to Abuse; The ACLU's Civil War About "Hate Speech" Crimes, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1993,
at A23; see also Hentoff, supra note 2.
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and other traditional civil liberties. This is the objection, for example, of
the so-called "Communitarian" movement, 4 which recently has gained so
much attention and influence. Both President Clinton and Vice President
Gore have long been associated with Communitarianism and both men
use its rhetoric.5 Political and academic exponents of Communitarianism
regularly assail the ACLU for not caring enough about collective or
community
concerns, and for being too staunchly committed to individual
6
freedom.
Although recently endorsed by Democrats, the Communitarian critique is a variation on the familiar and ongoing criticism we receive from
many conservatives who complain that civil libertarians are insufficiently
respectful of what they consider the community or group rights of, for
example, the "conventional nuclear family" or of dominant religious or
political factions. For conservatives, these rights often include the right
to impose draconian crime control measures, the right to government-supported religious exercises, and the right to maintain so-called "traditional
family values" by suppressing expression that challenges such values,
including allegedly "immoral" or "indecent" art that explores such themes
as homoeroticism and feminism.
From the opposite end of the political spectrum, our liberal and
left-wing critics regularly complain that we overlook what they consider
to be the collective rights of certain groups or communities in our allegedly over-zealous defense of individual rights. The only difference between the critique from the left and the critique from the right is in the
nature of the particular groups we are accused of shortchanging. According to many of our liberal and left-wing critics, we wrongly defend the
4 As articulated in the Communitarian platform, authored by Amitai Etzioni, William
Galston and Mary Ann Glendon, Communitarians' "first and foremost purpose is to affirm
the moral commitments of parents, young persons, neighbors, and citizens, to affirm the
importance of the communities within which such commitments take shape and are
transmitted from one generation to the next." The Responsive Communitarian Platform:
Rights and Responsibilities, in AMITAI ETzIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS,

RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 251, 266 (1993). For a discussion

of the principles of Communitarianism by one of its leading advocates see Cass R.
Sunstein, The Republican Civic Tradition:Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539 (1988). For an analysis of the Communitarian critique see Michael Walzer, The
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 7 (1990).

-'Forexample, in a speech that garnered much attention, President Clinton asserted,
"We cannot ...repair the American community and restore the American family until we
provide the structure, the values, the discipline and the reward that work gives." E.J.
Dionne, Jr., Clinton's Bully Pulpit, WASH. POST., Nov. 16, 1993, at A21. See also Ruth
Shalit, Family Mongers; 'Family Values' and Politics, NEW REP., Aug. 16, 1993, at 12;
Amitai Etzioni, Clinton is Talking Like One, But is He a Communitarian?NEWSDAY, May
17, 1993, at 39.
6 See, e.g., AMITAi ETZIONI, PUBLIC POLICY IN A NEW KEY 31-36 (1993) (commenting that some, such as the ACLU, "feel so strongly about the primacy of rights and so
resentful of the implications of social responsibilities that they are blind to the peculiarity
of the positions they advance.").
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free speech rights of those who speak out in ways they deem harmful to
oppressed minority groups. For example, the National Lawyers Guild
condemned what it called our "poisonous evenhandedness" when the
ACLU defended the rights of neo-Nazis to demonstrate peacefully in
Skokie, Illinois, in the late 1970s. 7 Some civil rights advocates sharply
criticize the ACLU for opposing restrictive hate speech codes on college
campuses. 8 Many feminists, most prominently Andrea Dworkin and
Catharine MacKinnon, bitterly denounce us for defending free speech
rights for what they condemn as "pornography.' 9 And recently, my own
state's affiliate, the New York Civil Liberties Union, was criticized by
some gay rights advocates for defending the First Amendment rights of
the Ancient Order of Hibernians to choose whom they would include in
their St. Patrick's Day Parade and whom they would exclude from the
parade, namely representatives of the Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization.' 0
The foregoing examples are but a small sampling of the ACLU's
staunch defense of expression that is deplored across the political spectrum. In light of this work, if you told most ACLU critics-ranging from
Andrea Dworkin to Ed Meese-that we are too soft on free speech and
too supportive of community or group rights, they would have a good
laugh. Similarly, those who decry our speech-protective positions on such
issues as tobacco advertising, campaign finance, and television violence
7 SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU

326 (1990). See also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978);
DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE FIRST

AMENDMENT (1985); JAMES L. GIBSON & RICHARD D. BINGHAM, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
NAZIS: THE SKOKIE FREE-SPEECH CONTROVERSY (1985); ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY
ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979).

8 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist

Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 436-37, 457-58, 474 n.155, 476-80; but see
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech On Campus: A Modest Proposal? 1990 DUKE
L.J. 484, 489-90, 498-500, 539-41, 552-54 (responding to Lawrence's criticisms of the

ACLU).
9For the Dworkin-MacKinnon analysis of pornography see ANDREA DWORKIN &
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR
WOMEN'S EQUALITY (1988); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN

(1988); Catharine A. MacKinnon, FrancesBiddle's Sister: Pornography,Civil Rights, and
Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 163, 175-77 (1987);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography
As Defamation and Discrimination,71 B.U. L. REV. 793 (1991); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1985).
10 See New York County Board of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F.
Supp. 358, 366-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that denying a permit to a parade because of
its expressive content clearly violates the First Amendment); see also Maurice Carroll,
Gays Can March; Ruling Fuels St. Pat's Day ParadeFlap, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 1992, at
3; Patricia Cohen, St. Patrick'sRuling; The ParadeMust Go On, NEWSDAY, Feb. 27, 1993,
at 11; Deborah Pines, Denialof ParadePermit Sparks Sharp Questioning at Hearing,NEW
YORK L.J., Feb. 23, 1993, at 1.
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would laugh if you told them that the ACLU is willing to sacrifice free
speech principles for trendy liberal causes.
It is important to keep this perspective in mind as we consider the
opposite critique, the "rights-versus-liberties" critique. This criticism,
though infrequent, is important because it cuts directly to the core of our
organizational mission. When we are accused of defending individual
rights too zealously, that is a sure sign that we are doing a good job. Our
work will necessarily provoke that type of criticism since our job is to
defend the rights of individuals and groups precisely because they do not
enjoy the support of the majority. If our clients were popular, our advocacy would be unnecessary. In contrast, when we are accused of abandoning our mission of championing individual rights, it is a grave charge
indeed, and it merits a careful response.
The "civil-rights-versus-civil-liberties" critique, as I see it, has five
recurring elements, all of which are based on myths and misconceptions
about the ACLU and civil liberties:
First, that the ACLU was founded to defend free speech and recently
has expanded its agenda to defend other rights, particularly the rights of
various minority groups, including racial minorities, women, lesbians, and
gay men.
Second, that there is an inherent conflict between so-called "traditional civil liberties," most importantly, free speech, and so-called "civil
rights" or equality rights of groups that have traditionally suffered discrimination. This purported conflict is sometimes described as that between liberty and equality.
Third, that the ACLU cannot vigorously defend liberty if it also
defends equality and, therefore, the ACLU must choose between civil
liberties and civil rights.
Fourth, that free speech should be absolute and should not be balanced against other rights.
Finally, fifth, that the ACLU should "go back" to defending only civil
liberties and leave the defense of civil rights to other organizations, such
as the NAACP, the National Organization for Women, and Lambda.
The first premise is historically inaccurate and is inconsistent with
the unique and essential role that the ACLU has played, and must continue
to play, in our society. To start with, the ACLU was not founded only to
defend free speech." From the very beginning, the organization has been
concerned with a broad range of fundamental civil liberties and civil
rights.1 2 Our conception of fundamental rights has always included equal' For a discussion of the founding of the ACLU in 1920, see WALKER, supra note 7,
at 45-47 (1990).
12Indeed, the original statement of the ACLU's mission, published in 1921, described
its organizational enemy as "the new machinery for the suppression of opinion and of

1994

The Defense of Freedom and Equality

ity rights, which, like free speech rights, are content neutral, even though
they are exercised by members of particular groups. We have always
recognized that just as the right to march in a peaceful demonstration does
not become a Nazi right when asserted by Nazis, so too the right to be
free from discrimination does not become a special right of minorities,
women, lesbians, or gay men, just because these constituencies struggle
to secure it.
I do not mean to suggest that the ACLU has always held exactly the
same positions as it does today. Certainly, over time the ACLU has
expanded its conception of fundamental rights, much as the United States
Supreme Court has done. For example, we did not always take the position that the death penalty inherently constitutes cruel and unusual pun-14
ishment 13 or that a woman has a fundamental right to choose an abortion.
But, from the beginning, we did have an overarching goal of defending
all fundamental rights for all people.
It is, therefore, wholly inaccurate to say that the ACLU has only
recently expanded its agenda to defend other rights beyond free speech.
Moreover, the other fundamental rights that the ACLU has vigorously
advocated since its founding include the equality rights of racial minorities, women, and other traditionally oppressed groups. This is an aspect
of our history that I have studied and written about, and of which I am
very proud. 15 I am pleased to recount a few of the early highlights of this
extensive and continuing history.
In the early years of the civil rights movement, the ACLU worked16
closely with lawyers from the NAACP to plan the attack on segregation.
In 1931, the ACLU published a comprehensive report on legalized racism
entitled Black Justice.17 We also played an important role in the infamous
traditional minority and individual rights?' AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE FIGHT
FOR FREE SPEECH: A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE PRESENT CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, AND OF THE WORK OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION AGAINST THE

FORCES OF SUPPRESSION 4 (1921). The statement enumerated two specific components of
the ACLU's resistance to reaction: "first, activities looking toward a reorganization of our
economic and political life, and second, the demand for the 'rights' of those minorities
and individuals attacked by the forces of reaction?' Id. at 5.
13 For the ACLU's current position see the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION POLICY
Policy No. 239 (1993) [hereinafter ACLU POLICY GUIDE].
GUIDE,
' 4 The ACLU National Board adopted a policy affirming the right of women to have

an abortion in 1967. See Nadine Strossen, Essay: The American Civil Liberties Union and
Women's Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1948 (1991); WALKER, supra note 7, at 302.
15

See Strossen, supra note 14; Strossen, supra note 8, at 550-54; Mary Ellen Gale &
Real ACLU, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161 (1989).
Nadine
6 Strossen, The
' WALKER, supra note 7, at 89.
'71d. at 88. It is not surprising to note that, far from limiting itself to a discussion of
free speech rights, Black Justice addressed, among other topics, the right to vote, the right
to marry, the right to an education, the right to equal access to public accommodations,
and the right to choose unsegregated housing. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
BLACK JUSTICE (1931).
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Scottsboro cases in the early 1930s in which nine young black men were
charged with raping two white women after sham trials before all-white
juries. 18 It was an ACLU attorney, Walter Pollack, who argued and won
the first of those cases to reach the Supreme Court.1 9
During World War II, the ACLU sponsored a challenge to the segregated draft and organized the Committee Against Racial Discrimination. 20
In the 1950s, the ACLU successfully challenged state laws that made it a
crime for a white woman to bear a child she had conceived with a black
father, 21 and in the 1960s the ACLU fought for and won many civil rights
victories, including a landmark ruling in Loving v. Wrginia,22 which struck
down laws criminalizing inter-racial marriages.
Our historic record on behalf of women's rights is equally impressive. Since our founding, we have consistently championed the rights of
women, even when few others were doing so. Way back in 1922, we
defended the distribution of a birth control pamphlet written by one of
our founding mothers, Mary Ware Dennett, after the Postal Service
banned it as "obscene." 23 In 1937, we fought for the right of schoolteachers on maternity leave to be reinstated in their jobs after their children
were born.24 In the 1940s, the ACLU established the Committee on Discrimination Against Women, which supported legislation guaranteeing
equal pay for equal work and opposed laws prohibiting birth control
devices and information regarding their use. During this decade, the
ACLU also challenged a Massachusetts law prohibiting married women
25
from teaching in public schools.
In the 1960s, the ACLU played a leading role in the then new
movement for women's reptoductive freedom. In 1965, the ACLU joined
Planned Parenthood in the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut,26
which struck down a state prohibition on the prescription, sale, or use of
contraceptives. In 1967, we became the first national organization to call
for the right of all women to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. 27

IsFor a history of the

Scottsboro cases see DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY

OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969).

19Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (reversing for inadequate assistance of
counsel in a capital case); see also Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935) (remanding
because
exclusion of blacks from jury denied defendant equal protection).
20
WALKER, supra note 7, at 163.
21
See ACLU's Thirty-Six Year Fight for Women's Rights, ACLU WOMEN'S RIGHTS
REPORT, Spring 1980, at 2, 3.
22388 U.S. 1 (1967).
23
See Strossen, supra note 14, at 1947; WALKER, supra note 7, at 84-86.
24
See Strossen, supra note 14, at 1947; WALKER, supra note 7, at 167.
25
See Houghton v. School Comm. of Somerville, 28 N.E. 2d 1001 (Mass. 1940).
26381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27
See Gale & Strossen, supra note 15, at 164; Strossen, supra note 14, at 1948;
WALKER, supra note 7, at 302.
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The ACLU's long-standing work on behalf of African Americans and
women illustrates our historic commitment to defending the rights of all
people who are victims of discrimination based on membership in certain
societal groups. This commitment is also manifested in our ardent advocacy of lesbian and gay rights. I am very proud that we have been praised
in the gay press as the first so-called "mainstream" organization to advocate lesbian and gay rights when there were very few specialized organizations focusing on that cause. 28 In the 1950s, the ACLU opposed specific
violations of the rights of lesbians and gay men, including police entrapment of gay men and the proposed compulsory registration of gay people.29 In 1966, the ACLU formally endorsed the broader principle that
individuals should not be deprived of rights because of their sexual orientation and in 1973 launched the Sexual Privacy30Project to fight all forms
of discrimination against lesbians and gay men.
The preceding overview of ACLU history demonstrates that the second premise of the "rights-versus-liberties" critique is, like the first, without foundation. There simply is no irreconcilable conflict between socalled "classic civil liberties" and so-called "civil rights." Specifically,
free speech is not incompatible with the equality rights of groups that
have traditionally suffered discrimination.
The myth of irreconcilable conflict assumes that there is something
special about the relationship between free speech and equality rights that
sets it apart from relationships among other rights. This assumption encompasses two basic misconceptions. First, it presumes that equality
rights are different from other rights because they, unlike others, can
conflict with free speech. Second, it presumes that equality rights are
necessarily and consistently in tension with free speech. Both of these
presumptions are wrong.
First, all rights can come into conflict with all other rights, and often
do. Even within the realm of what self-described "civil liberties purists"
call classic civil liberties, there are conflicts. For example, we often
wrestle with tensions between free speech and privacy, between free
speech and due process, and between free speech and non-establishment
of religion. Yes, equality rights are sometimes in tension with free speech,
but that does not distinguish them from any other rights.
28
See, e.g., Robin Kane, Helms, Dannemeyer Help Build Pro-Gay Coalitions, WASH.
BLADE, May 11, 1990, at 1, 6 ("the ACLU has led the nation's non-Gay organizations in
supporting Gay rights since its initial involvement with Gay issues in the late 1950s.").
For a concise account of the development of the ACLU's policy on lesbian and gay rights,

see WILLIAM A. DONOHUE, THE POLITICS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

281-85 (1985). For the current ACLU policy on sexual orientation, see ACLU POLICY
Policy No. 264 (1993).
GUIDE,
29
WALKER, supra note 7, at 312.
30
Id.
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Because the ACLU is committed to respecting all rights, it must make
accommodations among different rights if and when they conflict. In
making this accommodation, we accord the freedom of speech great
deference, deference that is required by the Constitution and that we
strongly believe is indispensable in a free and humane society. Nonetheless, we are not now willing, nor have we ever been willing, to sacrifice
or ignore other fundamental freedoms, or the equality rights of some
members of our society, in order to pursue an unyielding defense of free
speech.
Second, the fact that equality rights sometimes are in tension with
free speech does not mean that equality rights are inevitably or even
usually in conflict with free speech. To the contrary, free speech and
equality rights often go hand in hand. Frequently, a denial of one is also
a denial of the other, as when unequal treatment takes the form of silencing. 3 1 This interrelationship between free speech and equality is vividly
illustrated by the Pentagon's "new" policy on lesbians and gay men, who
now may not be drummed out of the service because of their sexual
orientation alone, but who may still be drummed out for revealing that
orientation. As the ACLU/Lambda lawsuit 32 challenging this policy has
recognized, the policy violates both free speech and equality rights.
This interrelationship between free speech and equality also underlies
the ACLU's opposition to many other attempts to restrict speech. We
oppose campus "hate speech" codes 33 both because they inhibit free
speech 34 and because they do not meaningfully promote and may in fact
31See William B. Rubenstein, Since When Is the Fourteenth Amendment Our Route to
Equality?: Some Reflections on the Construction of the Hate Speech Debate from a
Lesbian/Gay Perspective, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 19, 23-24 (1992); Paul Siegel, Lesbian
and Gay Rights as a Free Speech Issue: A Review of Relevant Caselaw, 21 J. HOMOSEXUALITY32 203, 204, 251 (1991).

Doe v. Aspin, Civil Action No. 93-1549 (D.D.C. filed July 27, 1993). See also Gay
Policy Draws Fire, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 6; Dimitra Kessenides, Pro Bono, AM.
LAw., Oct. 1993, at 98. In an earlier lawsuit brought by the ACLU and Lambda, Pruitt v.
Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655, (1992), the Ninth Circuit
was able to avoid ruling on whether a discharge based on a statement that a person is
homosexual violates the First Amendment because, under the old policy, it was the status
of being
gay or lesbian, and not speaking the words, that was grounds for discharge.
33
See infra pp. 155-56.
34The ACLU has successfully challenged several campus hate speech codes as
violative of the First Amendment. Although some challenges were resolved through
negotiation, two resulted in the only two judicial rulings on such codes. See Doe v.
University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (permanently enjoining the
part of the code restricting speech but denying an injunction as to the code's regulation
of conduct); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System,
774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wisc. 1991) (striking down University of Wisconsin code as
overbroad and unduly vague). Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on campus
speech codes, its decision in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), suggests that
codes that explicitly prohibit specific ideas are not constitutional. The St. Paul ordinance
at issue in the case cited cross burnings and Nazi swastikas as specific examples of
prohibited expression.
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undermine equality of opportunity. In terms of promoting equality, censoring hate speech is at best ineffective, and at worst counterproductive,
for the following reasons: censorship increases attention to, and sympathy
for, bigots; it drives bigoted expression underground, thus making effective responses more difficult; it is a powerful, discretionary tool, which
government enforcement authorities consistently have used disproportionately to repress the speech of the very minority groups that the measures
are intended to protect; it reinforces paternalistic stereotypes about members of minority groups; it generates a backlash of ill-will toward the
minority groups that are perceived to be the proponents or causes of
from measures addressing discriminacensorship; and it diverts resources
35
conduct.
and
tory attitudes
Similarly, when we oppose those, such as Andrea Dworkin and
Catharine MacKinnon, who would censor misogynistic "pornography"
and who argue that this censorship fosters women's equality, 36 we do so
because such censorship schemes are doubly flawed. First, they contravene free speech principles. Second, they undermine women's equality
rights by giving government officials a powerful tool for suppressing
works by and about feminists and lesbians; by perpetuating demeaning
stereotypes about women, including that sex is bad for us; by perpetuating
the disempowering image of women as victims; by distracting us from
constructive approaches to reducing discrimination and violence against
women; and by undermining free speech, thereby depriving feminists of
a powerful tool for advancing women's equality.37 To the extent that some
pornography may communicate a misogynistic message, the ACLU maintains, consistent with our commitment to women's equality, that women
are perfectly capable of rejecting that message for themselves and successfully urging men to reject it as well.
The often positive interrelationship between free speech and equality-and between censorship and inequality-reflects the fact that free
speech and equality, at bottom, are simply different aspects of the same
broader underlying values: respect for individual autonomy and dignity
and for societal diversity and pluralism. In a society that respects the
autonomy and dignity of individuals, all people would be free to express
their views, no matter what their views or who they were. Likewise, in a
society that respects diversity and pluralism, all individuals would be free

35 See Strossen, supra note 8, at 554-69 (arguing that means consistent with the First
Amendment could promote racial equality more effectively than censorship). See also
Jr., Let Them Talk, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at 37.
Henry
36 Louis Gates,
37

See sources cited supra note 9.
See Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "the" Feminist Critique of Pornogra-

pity, 79 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1993). For the text of the ACLU's policy on pornography see
ACLU POLICY GUIDE, Policy No. 4 (1993).
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to express any ideas, regardless of whether the speaker or the idea diverged in any way from the societal norms.
The multiple positive interconnections between free speech and
equality demonstrate that, contrary to the third premise of the "rights-versus-liberties" critique, the ACLU can vigorously defend liberty at the
same time that it defends equality. Indeed, we cannot adequately defend
either unless we vigorously defend both. I believe it is conceptually
impossible for a dedicated human rights advocate even to draw a meaningful distinction between liberty and equality, let alone to see them as
being somehow inalterably in opposition to each other. How could we
possibly claim to have secured individual liberty if some individuals are
denied liberty because they belong to certain societal groups? Conversely,
how could we possibly claim to have secured meaningful equality for all
groups of people if that equality does not encompass the exercise of
individual freedom?
Constitutional law professor Kenneth Karst has explained well the
symbiotic relationship between liberty and equality-between civil liberties and civil rights.
[T]he constitutional values of equality and liberty are fundamentally linked by the notion that equal access to certain institutions
and services is a prime component of any meaningful liberty.
This link is reflected in the language of egalitarian movements.
The civil rights movement of the 1960s, for example, marched
under the banner of "Freedom" even though its chief objective
was equal access-to the vote, to education, to housing, even to
lunch counters. "Liberation" is today a theme of more than
rhetorical significance in egalitarian causes such as the women's
38
movement.
The interdependence of liberty and equality points to the falsity of
the fourth plank in the "rights-versus-liberties" attack, that one should not
in theory and cannot in practice balance free speech against any other
rights. Free speech is not, as some assert, absolute, and the ACLU has
never taken such a position. Nonetheless, the ACLU proudly bears the
label "free speech absolutist' The parameters of the free speech debate
are such that even those who are described as "free speech absolutists"
or "purists" do not argue that all words and expressive conduct are absolutely protected. In truth, the only argument between free speech absolutists and others is not over whether speech can be regulated, but only over
38Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. CHi.
L. REv. 20, 43-44 (1975).
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when it can be regulated 3 9 Absolutists impose a40heavier burden of proof
on those who seek to justify speech restrictions.
As free speech purists, we in the ACLU always have maintained that
speech may be restricted only when necessary to promote a countervailing
goal of compelling importance, such as preventing violence. Unlike our
critics, we view other fundamental rights as possessing such compelling
importance. Therefore, if restricting speech is necessary to protect those
rights, we will not oppose restricting speech. For example, our very
speech-protective policy on campus hate-speech codes recognizes that
some speech could and should be punished. Even Nat Hentoff, despite his
criticism that the ACLU is veering away from his conception of free
speech absolutism, 41 has praised this policy.42 Specifically, that policy
includes the following qualification:
This policy does not prohibit colleges and universities from
enacting disciplinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harassment, intimidation and invasion of privacy. The fact that words
may be used in connection with otherwise actionable conduct
43
does not immunize such conduct from appropriate regulation.
39Even Nat Hentoff himself, a self-professed free speech purist, advocates speech
restrictions to protect countervailing rights that he considers particularly important. This
became clear during a recent radio debate that I had with him. After Hentoff had
denounced the ACLU for allegedly departing from a purist defense of free speech, and I
had rebutted that attack, we answered calls from listeners. As usual, virtually all the callers
who criticized the ACLU complained that we were too zealous in defending various forms
of unpopular speech. One such call predictably attacked our position on child pornography:
namely, that those who actually exploit children in producing sexually explicit works
should be punished, but those who merely view such works should not be. See ACLU
POLICY GumE, Policy No. 4 (1993). To my amazement, Hentoff-who a minute before
had been arguing that free speech should never be limited to promote any countervailing
value-agreed with this caller. He criticized the ACLU's defense of the right to view
sexually explicit pictures of children and expressed his overriding concern for the privacy
rights of the children shown in these works. Even such an outspoken free speech purist
as Nat
Hentoff compromised free speech in a situation where the ACLU does not.
40
Landmark Supreme Court decisions likewise hold that speech may be restricted only
under limited, extraordinary circumstances. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41 See sources cited supra note 3.
42
See Nat Hentoff, The ACLU and Mr. Hyde, WASH. PosT, Mar. 23, 1991, at A21.
43
ACLU POLIcY Gum., Policy No. 72a (1993) (footnotes omitted). The footnotes
accompanying this portion of the policy explain:
Although "harassment," "intimidation" and "invasion of privacy" are imprecise
terms susceptible of impermissibly overbroad application, each term defines a
type of conduct which is legally proscribed in many jurisdictions when directed
at a specific individual or individuals and when intended to frighten, coerce, or
unreasonably harry or intrude upon its target. Threatening telephone calls to a
minority student's dormitory room, for example, would be proscribable conduct
under the terms of this policy. Expressive behavior which has no other effect than
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The graduation prayer controversy provides another good example.
Those who advocate school-sponsored prayer by students or other speakers at public school commencement ceremonies argue that such prayer is
protected free speech. But we have consistently maintained that this
speech has to be limited in order to protect the rights of graduating
students to be free from government-endorsed religion as guaranteed by
the Establishment Clause.44 Certainly, abiding by the Establishment
Clause, far from being a "trendy" liberal cause, is a compelling interest
whose historic importance matches that of free speech, its companion in
the First Amendment.
Similarly, the ACLU National Board cannot fairly be said to have
abandoned the First Amendment by failing to defend the particular speech
involved in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 45 a case recently decided by the Supreme Court. In Mitchell, the defendant and his friends were young
African-American men who, stirred by Mississippi Burning, the movie
they had just seen, were discussing their anger against whites. The defendant said to his friends, "Do you feel hyped up to move on some white
people?" When he spotted a white boy walking across the street, the
defendant said to his companions, "There goes a white boy; let's go get
him." He then counted to three and pointed in the boy's direction. The
group immediately ran toward the boy and subjected him to a near-fatal
beating. 46 If that speech was not intentional, imminent incitement to violence, which is as unprotected under ACLU policy as it is under Supreme
Court precedents, I do not know what would be.
Although I want to emphasize that the ACLU necessarily does balance and always has balanced free speech and other fundamental rights,
as an inevitable incident of defending all such rights, I do not mean to
suggest that deciding when and how to do so is always easy. In difficult
cases involving tensions between rights, those of us within the ACLU will
strike somewhat different balances as we strive to give maximum protection to all of the rights at stake. There will be dissenting votes and some
units of the organization will disagree . ith others.
Though I do not want to overlook these occasional, though inevitable,
difficulties, I am concerned that the recent spate of publicity focusing on
ACLU board debates over several especially complex issues, in which the

to create an unpleasant learning environment, however, would not be the proper
subject of regulation.
Id. at 142a n.3. The notes also state that "intimidating telephone calls, threats of attack,
extortion and blackmail are unprotected forms of conduct which include an element of
verbal or written expression." Id. at 142b n.1.
44See ACLU POLIcY GuIDE, Policy No. 81 (1993).
45113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
46
d. at 2196-97.
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tensions among competing civil liberties concerns are particularly acute,
has distorted the degree of disagreement among us for two reasons. 47
First, the distortion results from a failure to recognize that the policy
issues that our national and state boards debate include the hardest issues
that we face. That is why we debate them. But the vast preponderance of
what we do, as opposed to what we debate, involves implementing longestablished, widely accepted civil liberties policies and principles.
Moreover, even on the difficult policy issues, the disputes tend to be
only at the margins, often on abstract propositions or hypothetical cases.
If, instead of focusing on the margins, we take a broader view of the entire
free speech spectrum, it is apparent that the ACLU's national and state
board members, and indeed all others in the civil liberties camp, take
positions very close to each other at the absolutist end of the range. This
means that with regard to most actual cases, we enjoy a very broad
consensus as to which position best accords with civil liberties principles.
In short, even when civil libertarians disagree with each other about
abstract policy formulations, we may still agree about the proper outcome
in the cases we actually confront. For example, in 1990 the ACLU's three
California affiliates adopted policies that would, in principle, tolerate
campus hate speech codes that are somewhat more restrictive than those
that the national policy would tolerate. 48 Some "free speech purists" who
have accused the ACLU of getting soft on free speech have pointed to the
hate speech policies of the ACLU's California affiliates as demonstrating
this alleged drift.4 9 Yet even the theoretical differences among the policies
are negligible, since all are near the absolutist end of the free speech
spectrum. Moreover, when we turn from theoretical discussions to practical actions, the differences among the policies fade from negligible to
non-existent. In practice the slightly differing policies have had no actual
impact on ACLU programs or action because all campus hate speech
codes that California universities have actually adopted are restrictive
47 See sources cited supra note 1.
4

8The National Board's policy, quoted above, while recognizing that colleges and

universities may restrict "acts of harassment, intimidation and invasion of privacy," also
cautions that "[e]xpressive behavior which has no other effect than to create an unpleasant
learning environment... would not be the proper subject of regulation" ACLU POLICY
GUIDE, Policy No. 72a n.3. In slight contrast, the California affiliate's policy that
apparently has the broadest definition of unprotected speech, the one maintained by the
ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties since 1990, condones the prohibition of hate

speech that is addressed to particular individuals and intentionally harasses them, when
such speech "creates a hostile and intimidating environment which the speaker knows or
reasonably should know will seriously and directly impede the educational opportunities
of the individual or individuals to whom it is addressed." AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION OF SAN DIEGO AND IMPERIAL COUNTIES, POLICY CONCERNING HARASSMENT ON
COLLEGE CAMPUSES (1993).
49

See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Battling Speech Police, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1990, at A24.

See also Hentoff, supra, nn.2-3, 42.
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enough to violate all of the California affiliates' policies as well as the
national policy. For example, the University of California's code sanctions
students for saying things that the speaker "should reasonably know will
interfere with the victim's ability to pursue effectively his or her education50
or otherwise to participate fully in University programs and activities.
The California affiliates oppose the code, just as the national office does,
because its broad wording reaches far beyond the realm of legitimately
unprotected speech and punishes and deters much speech that should be
constitutionally protected.
As another example, consider the issue of so-called "hate crimes,"
which I think are more accurately described as "discriminatory crimes:'
Several of the ACLU's state-based affiliates have taken the position that
First Amendment values are inherently undermined by all laws that impose added penalties for crimes whose victims are selected on a discriminatory basis. 5 1 In contrast, the ACLU's National Board has concluded that
some applications of some such laws would not necessarily be unconstitutional, if they were narrowly crafted and carefully applied so as not to
jeopardize First Amendment rights. Most important, the national policy
emphasizes that expression may not be considered as evidence that the
victim was selected on an intentionally discriminatory basis unless the
expression was tightly and directly linked to the underlying crime, as it
was in the Mitchell case. 52 In practice, though, most enhanced penalty
laws have not been crafted and applied with sufficient respect for First
Amendment values and therefore the national ACLU has opposed them.
The foregoing examples of situations where the ACLU has accepted
the difficult challenge of formulating positions that respect free speech
and other fundamental rights, bring us to the fifth and final plank in the
"rights-versus-liberties" critique. This plank urges the ACLU to "go back"
to defending only civil liberties and to leave the defense of civil rights,
with all of its attendant complications, to other organizations. This sug5

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITYWIDE STUDENT CONDUCT: HARASSMENT

POLICY, § 51.00 (1993) (enacted Sept. 21, 1989).

51 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio in Support
of Respondent at 4, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (No. 92-515) ("laws

such as Wisconsin's are conceptually infirm at their root: they seek to prevent harms to
certain groups, via the minds and words of the alleged perpetrator. In the view of the
ACLU of Ohio, such a 'detour' is not constitutionally permissible, particularly in light of

the fact that the conduct which is properly the object of state sanctions is already punished
under52 generally applicable laws!').
See ACLU POLICY GUIDE, Policy No. 242b (adopted Jan. 24, 1993) ("If properly

drawn, such laws do not punish protected speech or associations; rather, they reflect the
heightened seriousness with which society treats criminal acts that also constitute invidious

discrimination and are intended to or have the effect of depriving persons of legal rights
or of the opportunity to participate in their community's political or social life simply
because of their race, religion, gender, national origin, sexual orientation, or other group
characteristic:').
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gestion ignores the special role that the ACLU has played and should
continue to play in the defense of rights in American society.
As I noted above, from our earliest days, the ACLU has strived to
defend all fundamental rights for all people. This broad, neutral agenda
sets the ACLU apart from all other organizations and is the reason why
the ACLU continues to play an essential role in American society. Our
uniquely comprehensive human rights agenda gives the ACLU a special
responsibility, as well as a special opportunity, to influence government
decisions that attempt to respect and accommodate various rights.
Other organizations which define themselves either in terms of particular rights, such as free speech, religious freedom, or reproductive
freedom, or the rights of particular people, such as the rights of various
racial or religious groups, of women, or of lesbians and gay men, need
not hammer out the relationships between different rights and liberties.
They are free to privilege the particular right or rights that are of greatest
interest to them.
In contrast, the ACLU's unique mission to defend all rights neutrally,
for all people, prohibits us from engaging in such privileging where there
are tensions among different rights. We could not single-mindedly promote free speech and remain true to our organizational mission any more
than the Supreme Court could do so and remain true to the Constitution.
Just as judges and other government officials must struggle to respect all
rights, so too must the ACLU give these officials guidance on what those
courses should be.
By staking each of our particular positions on the principle that all
rights for all people are indivisible, each gains a special credibility and
power. We speak from a moral and intellectual high ground, rather than
from a special, personal interest on the part of our members. We would
forfeit these strengths were we to become just another advocacy group
arguing for the rights that most directly benefited ourselves.
I do not mean to be critical of organizations that have narrower
agendas, closer to the direct self-interest of their members-more power
to them and to the important causes they champion. The ACLU, though,
adds a unique and especially persuasive voice to their causes precisely
because we advocate those causes not out of self-interest but rather out
of principle.
This point has been forcefully made by the newest Supreme Court
Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg. She carried out her pioneering women's
rights litigation, which has led many to dub her "the Thurgood Marshall
of the women's rights movement," as the founding director of the ACLU
Women's Rights Project. She deliberately chose the ACLU as the vehicle
for her activism, rather than an organization with a narrower women's
rights agenda, in large part because she believed that the ACLU would
enhance the credibility of the women's rights cause. Justice Ginsburg has
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also said that she chose the ACLU because of the integral interconnection
between civil liberties and civil rights, including women's rights. "I
wanted to be a part of a general human rights agenda ... [promoting]
53
the equality of all people and the ability to be free"
A passage from a speech by Abraham Lincoln eloquently captures
my vision of the ACLU's special mission of bringing our society ever
closer to the interrelated ideals of liberty and equality that were set out
in the Declaration of Independence. What Lincoln said about the expansive reach of those founding national ideals also applies fully to the
ACLU's founding ideals and ongoing accomplishments. Lincoln said, and
I echo:
[T]he authors of [the Declaration of Independence] ... did not
intend to declare all men equal in all respects . . . . They ...

did consider all men created equal in "certain inalienable rights
.. . "'....
They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth,
that all were then actually enjoying that equality .

. .

. They

meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it
might follow ....

They meant to set up a standard maxim for

free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all;
constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though
never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby
constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors
54
everywhere.
Although the United States has advanced far closer to the ideal of
equal, inalienable rights for all than it was when Lincoln uttered these
inspiring words-and although I take pride in the large role that the
ACLU has played in that development-this ideal remains elusive. Thus,
the ACLU must maintain the "constant labor" for which Lincoln called
on behalf of the equal and inalienable rights of all people. As has been
recognized by the Declaration of Independence and Abraham Lincoln, we
are all entitled to both liberty and equality, to civil rights as well as civil
liberties.
53
54

ACLU's Thirty-Six Year Fightfor Women's Rights, supra note 21, at 5.

Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: COMPLETE WoRKs 232 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds. 1894).

